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Over the last two decades, there has been increasing concern 
regarding emerging and reemerging diseases, most of them 
zoonotic, involving either bacteria or viruses. The outbreak of 
diseases such SARS, avian influenza, and the new H1N1 influ-
enza has fueled interest in the design, construction, and opera-
tion of a plethora of new biosafety-biocontainment facilities 
and/or laboratories [12,13] in the USA and in Europe but also in 
Asia and Africa. However, all over the world [13], and particu-
larly in Europe, differences in the terminology and interpretation 
of the content of legislation on biosafety and laboratory biose-
curity have led to conflicting and sometimes inappropriate ap-
proaches to biosafety and biosecurity, and, in turn, to difficul-
ties in communication and scientific exchange.
Biosafety, biocontainment, and biosecurity issues are not 
always fully understood by members of the scientific commu-
nity, including those working inside such facilities, although 
usefull and extensive guidelines have been published by sev-
eral sources and are periodically updated [14–16].
Here, we begin by providing a few definitions, extracted 
from Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary, 1989, of 
some key terms closely related to the topic of our discussion.
Safety. The state of being safe; freedom from occurrence 
or risk of injury, danger, or loss.
Security. Freedom from danger, risk, etc; safety; some-
thing that secures or makes safe; protection; defense; precau-
tions taken to guard against theft, sabotage, the stealing of 
(military) secrets.
Containment. To hold or include within its volume or area; 
to keep under proper control; restrain.
These three terms, when applied to the management of bio-
logical issues, can, however, take on an ominous meaning 
when extrapolated to biosafety, biosecurity, and biocontain-
ment. Subtle differences arise, however, from the proper defi-
nitions listed above. Biosafety (Fig. 1) is closely related to the 
set-up and execution of procedures for non-risk (or, realistical-
ly, very low risk, as zero risk is unattainable) use, manipulation, 
and handling of pathogenic (for animal, plants, or humans) mi-
croorganisms, and it is definitively linked to the internal activi-
ties of a given research or production center. Therefore, bi-
osafety practices and procedures depend on factors linked to 
the microbial agent (its pathogenicity, host range, stability, and 
transmission route, for instance) and to the activity (volume and 
infectious titer handled, animal experimentation, etc.). Biosafe-
ty focuses on reducing exposure to and the release of biologi-
cal materials and countering their accidental release. It is cur-
rently managed by scientific staff in management positions, 
with the help of technical and research personnel. 
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Resum.	Els temes de bioseguretat, biocontenció i bioprotec-
ció no són sempre completament entesos per molts científics i 
comparteixen, pel públic en general, alguns significats omino-
sos. El sentit últim de les paraules prèviament esmentades 
—però també el disseny, la construcció i el funcionament 
d’aquests tipus de instal·lacions— seran discutides tenint en 
compte els significats complementaris. El disseny, la construc-
ció i la posada en marxa d’una unitat de biocontenció, req-
uereixen d’equips complementaris (i de vegades oposats) de 
persones que juguen els papers d’arquitectes, enginyers, 
científics però també de funcionaris. 
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Abstract.	Biosafety, biocontainment, and biosecurity issues 
are not always fully understood by members of the scientific 
community and, as for the general public, have in some cases 
acquired ominous connotations. This review seeks to better 
define these terms, in addition to discussing the design, con-
struction, and operation of safe and secure biocontainment fa-
cilites. These latter tasks require teams made up of architects, 
engineers, scientists, and public officials with complementary, 
but sometimes also conflicting interests.
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Biocontainment	(Fig. 1) is, in our opinion, more closely relat-
ed to the physical and construction-related factors associated 
with the design of the facility and thus belongs to the realms of 
architecs, engineers, and construction teams. Finally, biosecu-
rity (Fig. 1) is strongly related to the enforcement of security 
measures established for the installation in order to prevent the 
external (but also internal) activities of some people (luckily, few 
in number) who may compromise pathogen containment. Bi-
osecurity refers to ensuring the security of biological materials 
to prevent their theft or illicit use and to counter their deliberate 
release. Therefore biosecurity tries to prevent the potential pro-
liferation of bioweapons whereas the goal of biosafety is to try 
and mitigate biohazard [1]. Of course, biosecurity should not 
be the task of scientists, but rather the responsability of the 
general management of the facility and of public powers.
During the design and construction of a biosafety level 3 or 4 
(BSL-3 or BSL-4) facility, future security and containment con-
siderations must play primary roles. All operational and practi-
cal requirements have to be listed in a document that also de-
tails the future activities or processes to be conducted within 
the facility and by its personnel, an assessment of the evolution 
of the facility and its activities, and how to carry them out ap-
propriately. We cannot expect scientists to be leaders in bi-
osafety but rather to establish the playing-field, as these safety 
requirements are the responsibility of technical and scientific 
support staff who will take charge when the facility is up and 
running. Thus, the implementation of biosafey is initially the re-
sponsibility of a given facility’s architects, engineers, and con-
struction team. As an example, utilization of the correct materi-
als when the biocontainment facility is being built is an 
important issue, and an expert team would be aware of the fact 
that walls made of poured concrete are more durable than 
concrete masonry unit construction [4]. Furthermore, contain-
ment issues become more critical when the facility has to deal 
with large animals (calves, deer, chamonis, pigs, etc.) as they 
require boxes or housing units rather than caging systems as 
containment devices; thus, large-animal containment relies on 
the hermeticity of the building and all its junctions, doors, and 
windows [7,8].
The construction phase is also the time to decide on the 
types and extent of biosecurity tools to be installed in the bi-
osafety facility: closed circuit television (CCTV) systems around 
the building’s perimeter, linked with 24-h sufficient lighting lev-
els; CCTV within animal boxes for surveillance of animals and 
caretakers; zoned security access design, progressing from 
less restricted zones to more secure ones, by using card read-
ers, biometrics devices, or personnel security checks [4,6]. 
These measures are not restricted to BSL-3 and BSL-4 facili-
ties but could also be used in BSL-2 laboratories [6]. 
The construction of BSL-3 or -4 facilities is highly technical, 
and there are few universally recognized standards. Many sys-
tems have to be installed and connected in order to work in a 
cooperative manner [9]: heating, ventilating, and air condition-
ing (HVAC) redundancy, gas tightness, etc.; filtration systems 
and their control, i.e. high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) effi-
ciency testing, etc., not only in rooms but also in animal hous-
ing devices [2,10]; effluent and water treatment [3]; decontami-
nation devices and measures (air or water shower, fumigation); 
fire extinguishing and security systems; and, finally, structural 
and architectural components (e.g., leak-proof doors, win-
dows, and walls, and paints with resistance against chemicals, 
disinfectants, etc.). Some examples are shown in Fig. 2, which 
depicts a typical animal experimentation box. However, it must 
be noted that several containment issues are still under devel-
opment and can be expected to improve from year to year 
(waste treatment, fire extinguishing, leak tightness, etc.). Any 
wrong (or non-right) decision could have significant cost reper-
cussions. And one of the most typical wrong decisions in the 
design and comissioning of a containment facility is to save 
money in areas of flexibility and redundancy. In biocontainment 
animal facilities, it is highly necessary to provide alternative sol-
id-waste (carcass) disposal methods, such as the new devel-
opments in thermal and alkaline tissue digestion systems [4], to 
replace incineration, which has became very controversial due 
to environmental considerations. If it is economically and spa-
tially feasible, both systems should be included, working to-
gether as a commuted system. Redundancy criteria have to be 
applied also to electric power sources (an independent genera-
tor located in the facility is imperative), efluent liquid treatment 
(thermal but also chemical inactivation) [3], etc. Taking all these 
considerations into account, it is critical to realize that building 
costs for a BSL-3 facility will typically exceed by 2- to 4-fold 
those of a BSL-2, and this difference becomes even larger 
when operational costs come into play (200–800%). As the 
running costs of high-containment facilities are extremely high 
(energy, maintenance, dedicated personnel) and rapidly ex-
Biocontainment Biosafety Biosecurity
Fig.	1.	 How biosafety, bio-
containment and biosecu-
rity work.
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ceed investment costs, long-term funding for biosafety pro-
grams should be guaranteed before the planning of a high-
containment facility is initiated.
During this stage of design and construction, two heteroge-
neous teams are present. On the one side are those who want 
the project completed on time and with no changes in budget. 
Quite often, although not always, this side comprises project 
managers, architectual teams, and engineering and contract-
ing companies, who are also focused on containment and se-
curity issues. On the other side are those who want a pleasant, 
safe, and efficient facility in which to work. Typically, final users 
and maintenance teams (and in fact they are also users) have 
converging interests, which often also include those of the 
planned facility’s biosafety officers. All of the aforementioned 
individuals have as their priority the fulfillment and implementa-
tion of biosafety procedures.
When construction of the facility is completed, systematic as-
sessments of its compliance with specifications (electrical sys-
tem, access control, utilities, critical containment points such as 
joints and penetrations, mechanics, etc.) and strong validation 
performances have to be carried out [9]. Validation, which 
checks and records critical performances according to specific 
protocols, provides a realistic picture of the capabilities of the 
biocontainment facility. These tasks must be carried out by spe-
cific companies with sufficient expertise, joined by scientists.
During the validation period, personnel must be intensively 
trained in all the details about the facility’s systems, proce-
dures, and maintenance activities. The education of laboratory 
personnel to ensure compliance with biosafety rules must re-
main the top priority [11].
Only when validation (of ventilation systems, autoclaves and 
decontamination air-locks, biosafety cabinets, etc.) has been 
carried out and confirmed should the facility be used. Periodi-
cally thereafter, the facility should be re-validated, albeit to a 
lesser extent than during the first check. A summary of these 
activities is provided in Table 1, which also includes a schedule.
Other aspects regarding regulations and guidelines should 
be discussed. As regulations are minimal in terms of content, 
the goal should be to surpass their requirements; in fact some 
official guidelines recommend, but not force, enhanced con-
tainment measures. It is undoubtely preferrable to be capable 
of handling any risk posed by a group 3 pathogen without need 
for an up-grade (or simply having flexibility in this manner), rath-
er than to be confronted later on with the need to design, im-
plement, and validate new structural elements or procedures 
to meet a higher-level challenge. 
The meanings of biosafety, biocontainment, and biosecurity 
(Fig. 1) should not be confused with each other. Biosafety 
(linked to practices, handling, and experimental works) and 
biocontainment (physical and construction aspects only) are is-
sues that have been around for a long time. Biosecurity (the le-
gal and regulatory issues), in contrast, is a recent concern, at 
least to the extent that it involves the public and is not strictly a 
scientific issue. 
For instance, it is quite usual that the preparation of highly 
pathogenic viral or bacterial stocks implies the use of a centri-
fuge for phase separation [5]. Throughout the centrifugation 
process of these organisms, biosafety, biocontainment, and 
biosecurity all come into play, albeit at diferents levels (Fig. 1). 
Biosafety must answer several questions such as: How can 
highly pathogenic microorganisms be safely centrifuged (pro-
tective equipment, experimental actions, etc.) [5]? Biocontain-
ment is concerned with the implications derived the choice of 
procedure: What are the characteristics of the centrifuge? Is 
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Fig.	2. A diagram of an ani-
mal box (published with per-
mission of CReSA).
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the whole centrifuge hermeticly sealed to aerosols, or only the 
rotor? Can the centrifuge be located inside a biological safety 
cabinet (BSC), or, due its size, can only the rotor be opened in 
a BSC? Or, more interestingly, could a centrifuge be located 
inside a BSC without affecting its air-flow? What are the condi-
tions in the laboratory where the centrifuge is set up? How do 
the air supply and air exhaust systems in the laboratory work? 
Could the laboratory be sealed and decontaminated? Finally, 
biosecurity looks for appropritate answers to: Who has permis-
sion to enter the facility, and, especially, the laboratory when 
this work is in progress? Who is responsible for granting per-
mission? Are these processes controlled electronically? Is 
there a TV system monitoring all laboratories and animal facili-
ties? Are all movements of external personnel in the facility re-
corded, and are these personnel continuously supervised by 
internal staff? Is there proper and exhaustive control of patho-
genic biological material?
If we are genuinely committed to improving our prepared-
ness in biosafety issues we have to remove not only mental but 
also procedural barriers to reporting errors and infractions of bi-
osafety and biosecurity. We have to pursue a clearer definition 
of what constitutes exposure to a biologic agent, to demand 
better safety training of all laboratory personnel, and to be willing 
to spend money to maintain the physical infrastructure of high-
containment labs long after their construction is completed. 
We must therefore keep in mind that safety cannot be ex-
pressed in absolute terms. It is a relative concept defined in 
terms of tolerability, acceptability, and feasibility limits; it implies 
a balance between the cost of biosafety measures and the po-
tential benefits of the work for all of society [11].
Do conflicts arise in achieving the goals of biosafety, biocon-
tainment, and biosecurity? This is not often the case although it 
must be ensured that narrow biosecurity does not impinge 
upon or prevent well thought-out biosafety activities and pro-
grams. Nonetheless, biosafety, biocontainment, and biosecu-
rity must always be considered as words with complementary 
meanings to describe a general environment of responsible 
work in the handling highly pathogenic microorganisms. 
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